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Williams: Natural Gas and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

NATURAL GAS AND THE FEDERAL ENERGY
REGULATORY COMMISSION
Kenneth A. Williams*

I.

INTRODUCTION

As I am sure you have heard discussed in the last couple of days,
on August 4, 1977, the Department of Energy Organization Act1 was
passed by Congress and signed by the President. In the Organization
Act, an independent regulatory commission was established to be
called the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.' Henceforth, I
will refer to it as FERC. It is commonly considered and frequently
referred to as an extension or continuation of the Federal Power Commission (FPC), but in actuality, the FPC ceased to exist on September
30, 1977. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission commenced
operations on October 1, 1977.
II. FERC AUTHORITY
In order to help you understand what the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission does, I thought I would point out very briefly that in
the transition there were certain functions previously conducted or performed by the FPC that were transferred to FERC, which related to
both electric and gas matters. On the electric side, the FERC will continue to issue permits and licenses with regard to hydroelectric projects;
it will continue to regulate rates and charges, acquisitions of securities,
authorizations for interlocking directorates, and mergers and disposition of property.' On the gas side, the FERC assumed the responsibil* Deputy Director, Office of Pipeline and Producer Regulation, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission; B.A. Western Kentucky University.
I. Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565, (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352).
2. Id. at §§ 401-407, 91 Stat. 582-87 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7171-7177).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 792-828(c) (1976).
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ity for the regulation of producer and gatherer rates, the rates and
charges levied by interstate gas pipeline companies, the certification of
facilities, the certification of abandonments of facilities and service, and
the establishment and enforcement of curtailments on natural gas pipeline systems.4
In addition to assuming the responsibility for these functions, certain other functions were specifically assigned from FERC to other departments within the Department of Energy. One of these was the
establishment and review of priorities for natural gas curtailments. As
I said before, the FERC does have the responsibility for establishment
and enforcement of curtailments. But the responsibility for the establishment and review of priorities was transferred to the Secretary of the
Department of Energy. Another function that was specifically assigned to another part of the Department was the regulation of imports
and exports of both electricity and natural gas.5 In addition to the
functions that were transferred from the FPC and transferred to and
away from FERC, the Commission assumed certain new responsibilities.
One of them is the rate regulation of oil pipeline companies, and
the conduct of valuations of oil pipeline companies.6 Another is the
consideration of energy actions by the Secretary under certain circumstances. Also the Commission was given the responsibility for reviewing proposals by the Secretary with regard to proposed rules,
regulations, and statements of policy that might affect the jurisdiction
or responsibilities of FERC. FERC also has certain responsibilities
with regard to remedial orders of the Department of Energy, as well as
denials of requests for adjustments by the Secretary. This briefly establishes what the current responsibilities are. I would like to turn to
some of the areas where major problems exist today. It should be recognized that the FPC over the years was confronted with, or was beleaguered by, very difficult problems, most of which transferred over to
the FERC.
III.

GAS SUPPLY AND THE DUAL MARKET

The question of gas supply, and the response to the gas supply
shortage, was one of the problems that the FPC faced and wrestled
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717(w) (1976).
5. Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 583 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7172(0).

6. Id. (to be codified at § 7172(b)).
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with for a number of years. 7 By way of demonstrating what our situation is today, as of the end of 1976, according to American Gas Association data, our proven gas reserves totalled about 216 trillion cubic feet.
This was a continuation in the decline of proven reserves which began
in 1968,8 and it continues a trend in the significant different between
what we are producing and consuming and what we are adding in the
way of new reserves. By way of demonstrating this, in 1976 we produced 19.5 trillion cubic feet and we added 7.6 trillion cubic feet. With
that type of differential, we are going to continue to have declining
natural gas reserves.
Another matter that has been of major importance to the FPC and
now FERC is the fact that even with the continuing decline in new
reserves added, a smaller and smaller portion of those reserves has
been dedicated to interstate commerce. 9 This is particularly troublesome to a federal agency; it might be less troublesome to state and local
jurisdictions. For example, in 1976, of the 7.6 trillion cubic feet added,
only 2.8 were dedicated to interstate commerce. This is roughly thirtyseven percent. I might point out this is a much greater percentage than
had occurred in any previous year since 1973. The percentages had
been much smaller, and of course before 1973 the percentages were
larger. They were in the sixty to seventy percent range.
So we have a declining gas supply situation. We have the tendency to dedicate gas to the intrastate market in lieu of the interstate
market. We have a trend toward the drilling of developmental wells
rather than exploratory wells. I would like to point out that in 1976
there were substantially more total wells drilled than in 1975. In the
first three quarters of 1977, the same trend continued. There were
more wells drilled in 1977 than in 1976. On the other hand, the ratio
of developmental wells has continued to be high relative to the total
number of wells drilled. Obviously under this circumstance we are
adding very little additional proven reserves. It is not difficult to understand why under today's dual market system, it is advantageous and
7. Comment, Natural Gas Rate Regulatiorn The Conflict in the Application of the Just and
Reasonable Standard, 12 TULSA L. 293 (1977).
,8. See FPC, A STAFF REPORT ON NATIONAL GAS SUPPLY AND DEMAND (1969). Nineteen

sixty-eight was the first year that production and consumption of natural gas exceeded the amount
added to reserves through exploration and recalculation of present gas fields. In simple terms, it
signaled that unless the ratio changed toward more reserves, the U.S. would run out of gas.
9. There are two distinct natural gas markets. The intrastate market is regulated and includes only the gas which is produced, transported and consumed in one state. The interstate
market is regulated and includes all gas that crosses state lines. Breyer & MacAvoy, The Natural
Gas Shortage andthe RegulationoNaturalGasProducers,86 HARv. L. REv. 941 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Breyer & MacAvoy].
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even economic to drill developmental wells in lieu of exploratory wells.
There is a less risk; there is more assurance of recovering investments.
It is not difficult to understand why gas is being dedicated to the
intra, versus the interstate, market under the regulated, versus unregulated, situation that exists. So we have in the natural gas supply situation declining total natural gas proven reserves, a tendency to drill
developmental wells, and a propensity to dedicate the gas to the intra
versus the interstate market. I would like to point out that this is addressed primarily to onshore gas reserves. When one looks at the National Energy Plan'" as proposed by the administration, there are clear
indications that these conditions were recognized and the plan sets out
to correct some or perhaps all of them.
Under the National Energy Plan, the criteria for establishing eligibility for new gas prices were designed to encourage the drilling of exploratory wells; to the extent that developmental wells were drilled,
these wells would generally not get the higher price. The National
Energy Plan proposed by the administration would eliminate the differential, at least insofar as new wells are concerned, between the prices
that gas could be sold for in the inter and intrastate markets," and by
doing so might encourage some of the gas to go into interstate commerce. This obviously depends upon the market circumstances, buyer
circumstances, and the location of the particular production relative to
existing pipeline facilities.
As most of you know, the FPC, after the Phillis'2 decision in 1954
where it was told to regulate independent producers selling gas for resale in interstate commerce, attempted to perform that regulation on a
company-by-company basis. It became completely bogged down because of the number of companies, and the difficulties in reviewing the
books and records of each company.' 3 The Commission then went to
an area rate approach, in which it attempted to establish just and reasonable rates for different areas of the country.' 4 In Opinion Nos.
10. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ENERGY POLICY AND PLANNING, NATIONAL EN-

ERGY PLAN (1977).
11. Id. at 53.
12. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
13. The size and complexity of the task literally overwhelmed the FPC's administrative process; some 2,900 applications for individual rate determinations were received between 1954 and

1962. Processing the application of the Phillips Company alone took 82 days, filled 10,626 pages
with testimony and involved 235 exhibits. C. HASKINS, THE FIELD PRICE REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS 37 (1969); Breyer & MacAvoy, supra note 9, at 954.
14. PermianBasinAreaRate Proceeding,34 F.P.C. 159 (1965). See generally Mosburg, The
PermianDecision-A Study in Group Regulation, 19 OKLA. L. REv. 133 (1965).
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69915 and 770,16 the Commission went to a nationwide rate approach in
which the FPC established just and reasonable rates to be applicable on
a nationwide basis. One of the characteristics of the Commission's
Opinion 770, attempting to relate costs to production, was to employ
the spud date for establishing eligibility for new gas prices. I think it
can be said that even this spud date approach provides an incentive for
people to drill developmental wells in lieu of exploratory wells.
With the National Energy Plan now before Congress, the FERC
has chosen to defer further proceedings to determine general producer
pricing until there is some type of action or indication of action by the
Congress. If a National Energy Act is ultimately passed, it may not be
necessary to go through another rate proceeding. On the other hand, if
some action is not forthcoming, then the Commission will be faced
with the task of developing new just and reasonable rates under the
Natural Gas Act. 7
IV.

CURTAILMENTS OF NATURAL GAS

We are all aware of some of the problems and difficulties that we
have encountered, and that the nation has encountered as a result of
the gas supply shortage. The most visible problem and the one which
we are the most aware of is the natural gas curtailments, which includes
curtailments imposed by natural gas pipelines and curtailments imposed by distributors upon their markets. After 1968 the FPC recognized that there was a growing natural gas shortage18 and in April
1971, the Commission issued an order, designated Order No. 431, in
which it advised pipeline companies to take all actions necessary to
assure reliable and adequate service to their markets. The Commission also instructed pipelines expecting to be unable to provide such
service to file curtailment plans to be included in their tariffs. In 1973,
the Commission issued Order No. 467-B, 19 which detailed the Commission's policy with regard to priorities of service. The Commission assigned the highest priority to residential and small commercial use, and
the lowest priority to boiler fuel. There were nine priority categories
with the intermediate categories depending upon the use of the gas, the
ability to use alternate fuels, and the size of the requirements themselves.
15. 18 C.F.R. § 2562 (1976).
16. 41 Fed. Reg. 50,199 (1976).

17. 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1976).
18. FPC, STAFF REPORT No. 2, NATIONAL GAs SUPPLY AND DEMAND 1971-1990 (1972).

19. 49 F.P.C. 583 (1973).
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Today, most interstate pipeline companies have in effect and operate under some form of curtailment plan. Some of these plans have
been approved by the FPC or the FERC on a permanent basis. At
least one has been imposed by the courts, and others are in effect on an
interim basis pending final determination by the Commission.
A.

CurtailmentProcess

Each year the Commission requires two reports from the pipeline
companies as to what each company expects in the way of availability
of supplies and its projected curtailment for the coming heating season
as well as the next twelve months. In September of 1977, the pipeline
companies projected on an over-all basis, curtailments for this winter
heating season amounting to roughly twenty percent. On an annual
basis, they projected average curtailments of roughly twenty-five percent. Some pipeline companies projected curtailments as high as
forty-seven percent for this heating season. I think it is important to
recognize that there are wide variations in the levels of curtailment on
individual pipeline systems. Some are curtailing very little, and when
I talk of curtailment I am speaking in terms of curtailment of firm requirements generally determined upon customers requirements for
some base period.
Once the information is gathered on the projected curtailments,
companies that are projecting potential levels of curtailment that could
result in plant shutdowns or potential injury to life or property are
identified. Those companies are then called in and are the subject of
further review. This winter we conducted in intensive review of six
pipeline companies to determine exactly what their individual circumstances were, what had been done, what their options were, and how
we could avoid adverse impact both on the pipeline companies and the
markets they serve.
It should also be pointed out that in our proceedings involving the
individual pipeline companies, where we do pursue their situation in
detail, we work very closely with the Economic Regulatory Administration and rely upon their data on the availability of alternate fuels.
Where there is an indication of potential industrial shutdown, or where
there is an indication of gas not being available for certain industrial
applications, our concern is with the availability of alternate fuels.
As most of you know, curtailments have posed some serious difficulties for all of us. The pipeline companies recognize that curtailments have resulted in reduced throughput, and have created serious
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cost allocation problems. The availability of unused capacity on many
of the pipeline systems raises questions as to where the burden of the
costs associated with this capacity should fall. As a result of declining
supplies and the investment still remaining in many pipeline facilities,
the consumer has been exposed to higher unit costs for natural gas service. One of the most troublesome questions now facing FERC is what
to do about load growth. On many pipeline systems, even though the
pipelines are themselves in substantial curtailment, individual distributors are able to add loads because of the availability of alternate fuels,
and the availability of alternate sources of supply, such as synthetic
natural gas or liquid natural gas, storage or even local intrastate supplies. The Commission is faced with the question of whether, at this
time and under circumstances of curtailment, pipeline company operations should be changed so as to have the effect of making gas available
and encouraging, or making possible, load growth, particularly of high
priority loads. Obviously, there are considerations with regard to the
reliability of service, both at present and over time, the potential for
increasing curtailment to everyone down the road and when that will
occur, and the operations and economic consequences of requiring low
priority users to shift to alternate fuels. These are serious problems
that the Commission faces not only as a matter of policy, but as immediate issues in a series of cases. These issues are before the Commission in both curtailment cases and in certificate proposals to expand
storage.
B.

Compensatioh and Curtailments

Another problem that has been with us for most of the time that
curtailments have been with us, but which has become more difficult
with time, is the question of compensation. Where distributors and
end users have developed their operations in reliance on natural gas
service, but under implementation of curtailment plans they no longer
are able to receive that service, the question has been raised as to
whether low priority consumers should be compensated to offset the
cost of using alternate fuels by those other consumers continuing to
receive gas service. The FPC in a series of cases had held that this
constituted a sale, and that it could not legally require, nor was it disposed to implement, a compensation scheme in curtailment plans. The
courts have advised the Commission that it is not legally prohibited
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from implementing a compensation scheme,20 and on November 30,
1977, the Commission issued a preliminary notice of rulemaking in
which it required parties to respond both as to the criteria and methodology for the development of an equitable compensation plan. The
Commission recognizes it has the difficult task first of determining if an
equitable compensation scheme can be developed, and if so, how it can
be applied.
Another area associated with curtailments that presents a developing problem is the increased reliance upon emergency purchases.
Under section 7 of the Natural Gas Act,21 the Commission, although it
cannot exempt sales for resale, does have the authority not to require
certificate authority for actions taken under emergency conditions. In
order to avoid difficulties on individual pipeline systems and the markets they service, the Commission has permitted pipeline companies to
make emergency purchases and to flow the gas and the costs through to
the ultimate consumer. Some very difficult questions have arisen.
First of all, should those volumes be purchased specifically for particular end users who are in emergency situations? If so, how should they
be made available? Assuming that the gas is purchased for system
supply, how should the costs be recovered? Last winter (1976-1977),
the nation experienced a very difficult time 22 and Congress passed the
Emergency National Gas Act of 1977.23 In the legislation it appeared
that the emergency purchases would be for particular users who would
receive the gas and would bear the costs.
In a series of orders, the FPC attempted to implement that approach, but ultimately found that there was so much opposition and
that there was sufficient question as to the legislative intent, that the
emergency gas and the costs associated therewith were flowed through
on the basis of the effective curtailment plans that the individual pipeline companies were utilizing at the time. Consequently, the emergency gas was not purchased, made available and priced on the basis of
20. See generally, Fort Pierce Utility Authority v. F.P.C., 526 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1976); Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipeline, 532 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1976); Note, Liability of
Natural Gas Pipeline CompaniesforBreach of ContractDue to FPC-OrderedCurtailment, 1973
DUKE L.J. 867.

21. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (f) (1976).
22. While the effects of the winter of 1976-1977 cannot be fully assessed, it is clear that the
severe cold weather coupled with the gas shortage caused a major disaster. There were 75
weather-related deaths and the economics of 17 eastern states were seriously affected with over 2

million persons laid off from work. [1977] EN USERS REP. (BNA), No. 181, at 4-5, [19771 EN.
UsERs REP. (BNA), No. 182, at 6-7; WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1977 at 1, Col. 3.
23. Pub. L. No. 95-2, 91 Stat. 4 (1977).
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which customers and consumers benefitted from the availability of the
gas.
These are two of the problem areas. I won't go into such matters
as the Alaska Gas Project, where the Commission, the President and
the Congress have selected a successful applicant and the matter is now
back before FERC with regard to what kind of project should be
certificated, how it should be designed, how it should be financed and
what tariff provisions should be applicable. This is a major case that
will require a substantial expenditure of time and effort by the Commission over a long period of time.
V.

REGULATION OF OIL PIPELINES

I would like to talk about one new area that the FERC assumed
under the Organization Act-that being the oil pipeline regulation.
This is an area where those of us who were with the FPC had no prior
experience or knowledge. From records provided to us from the Interstate Commerce Commission, there are roughly 110 oil pipeline companies that are subject to our jurisdiction. These oil pipeline
companies file in the neighborhood of three to four thousand tariff
filings a year. We are required to conduct valuations annually on
roughly ninety of these pipeline companies and publish these valuations. In the transfer of the responsibility for the oil pipeline regulation, we received at least two cases that I think I should mention to you.
One is the Ex Parte 30824 case where the I.C.C. had originally instituted an investigation into the continued appropriateness of its methodology for determining valuations for oil pipelines.
Perhaps more important, and certainly more difficult, is the TransAlaska Pipeline Case, which was called the TAPS case. This case has
been phased, and we are now in the process of cross examination in
phase one, which has to do with rate return, rate base, and tax treatment. We will go through the cross examination of the company witnesses. Staff will subsequently serve its case, which will then be cross
examined and we will proceed into phase two. In Phase 2 staff will
conduct its own investigation and make recommendations as to the cost
that the companies should be allowed to recover.
The I.C.C. utilized boards for much of its regulation of oil pipelines, and there were roughly six boards that the I.C.C. utilized for pur24. Exparte No. 308, Valuation of Common Carrier Pipelines (decision pending in the Department of Energy).
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poses of oil pipeline regulation. On February 10, 1978, the FERC
established an employee board, which will perform the functions that
these I.C.C. boards performed with regard to oil pipelines. I would
like to point out that since this is a responsibility that we very recently
received, we will continue to follow the I.C.C. practices and procedures
until we have fully evaluated those procedures and made our own determinations. We may develop our own practices and procedures, but
it is too early to say if and when this may happen.
VI.

CONCLUSION

I have tried to touch briefly upon just some of the major problems
before the FERC. They are difficult problems. Under the Department of Energy Act, we now have a more coordinated effort, at least in
the federal government, with regard to approaching some of these
problems, but I should point out that we are an independent regulatory
commission, and so the opportunity to rely upon other parts of D.O.E.
is somewhat limited. We can take advantage of the expertise of the
Administrator of the Economic Regulatory Administration. We can
take advantage of the data-gathering authority of the Energy Information Administration, and we can utilize the research and development
expertise of the Department of Energy. Hopefully through the coordinated efforts of these different segments, we can be a much more effective independent regulatory commission, and hopefully with passage of
the National Energy Plan, we can solve some of the problems that have
been plaguing us for so long, and the solutions to which are so important to all of us.
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